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Abstract
Proponents of the knowledge-based approach to the firm argue that
organizational economics put all the burden on the allocation of incentives
and property rights in the explanation of organizational phenomena, and
neglects firm-specific knowledge and processes of learning.  We argue
that there is no inherent reason why organizational economics should be
cut off from treating learning and exploring its organizational
implications.  More specifically, we demonstrate that it is possible to
adopt an approach to learning that is consistent with rational choice
methodology and stresses economizing, puts the emphasis on learning as
a means of realizing efficiencies, is micro-analytic, and contains
implications for economic organization.  We concentrate on the role of
experimentation as a means of finding solutions to coordination problems
in complex production systems (e.g., finding the optimal sequence of
activities) and the transaction costs learning-by-experimenting may create.
Such transaction costs help determine the existence, boundaries and
internal organization of the firm, and has implications for the
understanding of competitive advantage.
11. Introduction
Ever since its take-off period at the beginning of the nineteen-seventies
(Williamson, 1971; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), organizational economics
(henceforth, “OE”) has never been without vocal critics.  Much of the
contemporary critique is represented by the knowledge-based approach to the
firm (henceforth, the “KBA”).  Proponents of this approach argue that they offer
explanations of organizational phenomena that are rival relative to those offered in
organizational economics (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996; Grant, 1996;
Madhok, 1996; Spender, 1996; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1999).  As Kogut and Zander
(1992: 384) note, the KBA view ... differs radically from that of the firm as a bundle
of contracts that serves to allocate efficiently property rights.”  And Madhok (1996:
578) argues that because OE “...basically ignores the essential notion of the firm as
a bundle of knowledge, and the underlying processes therein” it is fundamentally
“... is fundamentally incapable of being a complete theory of economic
organization.”  Moreover, KBA writers claim that it is possible to address  the
existence, boundaries, and internal organization of the firm —that is, the
explananda of OE— in terms of processes of accumulating, utilizing, and storing
knowledge (Grant, 1996), a focus that also has strong implications for the
understanding of competitive advantage.  In essence, KBA writers claim that theirs
is a perspective that  is inherently more dynamic, and that OE is cut off from such
a dynamic perspective because of its neglect of learning.
In this paper, we offer a discussion and an assessment of, first, how much the
KBA itself really has to say about learning in firms, and, second, of the potential of
OE to address this issue.  We shall provocatively argue that, in actuality, the KBA
has relatively little to offer with respect to such learning (“Firms, Learning, and the
Knowledge-Based Approach”).  Although it is correct that so far OE has had little to
say about learning,1 it is in no way cut off from addressing this issue and how it
                                                 
1 While bounded rationality is fully acknowledged by many contributors to OE (e.g., Williamson,
1985, 1996, 1998; Jensen and Meckling, 1992), the broader ramifications of bounded rationality (as
represented by, e.g., March, 1999) are never inquired into.  For example, satisficing search is absent
2connects to economic organization.  From an OE perspective, these issues should
be addressed using a micro-analytic focus; an economizing approach which directs
attention to efficiency issues; and comparative institutionalism which require
arguments of why one institution may more efficiently organize learning processes
than another one.  Thus, OE is a superior starting point for building an explanation
of what exactly it is that may make firms more efficient institutions for organizing
learning processes — something which is assumed rather than demonstrated in
the KBA (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1996; Madhok, 1996).
 In fact, we shall argue along such lines by developing the idea — mentioned
by Coase (1937) but noted by only a few of his followers— that firms may exist
because of the flexibility afforded by a structure of incomplete contracts and the
discretion provided by managerial authority.  Specifically, we develop this idea
into an argument that firms may have learning advantages because the use of
incomplete contracts and the discretion provided by authority are low-cost ways
of conducting controlled experiments with, for example, production technology
(Kirsten Foss, 2000) or marketing efforts (Cyert and Kumar, 1994).  In other words,
firms may more efficiently set up and conduct sequential optimal designs of
experiments in order to discover relevant information (cf. Blackwell, 1951).
In our view, understanding why this is so requires a micro-analytic focus that
directs attention to the rights of and constraints on agents with respect to carrying
out actions that may provide new information.   Such a focus is supplied by the
property rights perspective (Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Barzel, 1997; Hart, 1995)
(“Learning, Economic Organization, and Property Rights”).  As we shall argue, there is
a highly complex link between the distribution of rights in a firm and firm-level
learning (“Learning and Economic Organization: a Property Rights Perspective ”).  To
our knowledge, this is the first attempt in the literature to tease out implications
for learning in firms from such a perspective. We show how a combined learning-
property rights perspective have implications for the existence and boundaries of
the firm and also relate to issues of internal organization and competitive
                                                                                                                                          
in most OE treatments.  Bounded rationality mostly partakes of the limited role of rationalizing the
3advantage.   In particular, we argue that firms may be cost-efficient institutions for
what we call “learning-by-experimenting,” an argument that we support by
drawing on organizational economics, particularly the property rights perspective.
We also treat various implications and ramifications of the approach, such as the
general applicability of an experimental approach to firms and the distinction
between individual and organization learning (“Discussion”).
2. Learning and the Knowledge-Based Approach
The KBA very much reflects a number of diverse influences, and arguably exists
in somewhat different versions (e.g., competence-based and resource-based
approaches, the capabilities approach, etc.).   In this section, we shall briefly restate
some of the main insights of the KBP with respect to competitive advantage, the
boundaries of firms, the existence of firms and the internal organization.2
According to KBA writers, these issues should be addressed by means of a
theoretical “language” that places concepts as resources, routines, capabilities,
learning, and bounded rationality center-stage rather than opportunism, incentives
and property rights (notably Kogut and Zander, 1992).
The Knowledge-Based Approach
As already stated, the relation between the KBA and OE is often seen as one
of rivalry.  To quote two proponents of the KBA:
Our view differs radically from that of the firm as a bundle of contracts
that serves to allocate efficiently property rights [i.e., OE]... Rather, we
suggest that organizations are social communities in which individual
and social expertise is transformed into economically useful products
and services ... Firms exist because they provide a social community of
voluntaristic action structured by organizing principles that are not
reducible to individuals (Kogut and Zander, 1992: 384).
                                                                                                                                          
incompleteness of complex contracts (Williamson, 1985, 1996).
4To get an idea of the differences between the OE and the KBA, we here
summarize the KBA analysis as it relates to the central issues of competitive
advantage, and the boundaries, existence and internal organization of the firm.
The latter three of these four issues are, of course, the key issues that OE has
traditionally tried to address.  We place particular emphasis on these issues as
they relate to learning.
Competitive  advantage and learning. The KBA begins from the notion of
the firm as a bundle of heterogeneous resources.  Because resources mesh with
each other in a team-like manner, they are worth more to the firm than to the
market (meaning other firms).  They therefore yield rents.  Arguably, much of the
KBA analysis of the ability of resources of resources to yield rents has been cast in
a equilibrium mold where interest centers on whether it is possible to sustain an
equilibrium with firms characterized by resources of different efficiencies
(Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).  However, in itself this
analysis hardly comes to grips with the sources of heterogeneity.  Thus, firms are
seen as facing a distribution of given, heterogeneous resources; rents from
acquiring superior resources then stems from either luck (Lippman and Rumelt,
1982) or superior insight into the resource’s true value (Barney, 1986).  To the
extent that the KBA aspires to being a normative theory, this is obviously
unsatisfactory: The analysis only advices managers to be lucky or better informed
than the supply side on input markets!
Not surprisingly, therefore, interest has increasingly focused on how firms
themselves can create and improve resources (arguably at some cost in terms of
analytical precision).  Thus,  resources such as routines, capabilities,  competencies,
etc.  (in the following, we use the word “capabilities” to capture all these) are now
seen as central to the explanation of competitive advantage, rather those resources
that can be purchased on factor markets (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Teece, Pisano,
and Shuen, 1997). A distinction is made in the literature between two types of
capabilities.  The first type of capability is the ability to organize (coordinate,
                                                                                                                                          
2  For a more methodological discussion of the KBA, see Foss and Foss (2000a).
5integrate) existing resources; for example, they allow “multiple individuals [to]
integrate their specialist knowledge” (Grant, 1996: 112).   The other type of
capability refers to the firm’s ability to engage in learning (i.e., “dynamic
capabilities”, Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997).   Because both types of capabilities
may be tacit and firm-specific, they may be costly to imitate for would-be
imitators.   In fact, according to KBA writers, capabilities are particularly likely to
meet the KBA conditions for sustained competitive advantage.3
Considered as a normative theory, KBA has now changed from advising
managers to be lucky or better informed in their capacity as purchasers of
resources, to advise them to develop superior (dynamic) capabilities.  However, it
is characteristic of the literature that little is actually said about the means of
fostering superior capabilities.   In our view, this is due to the facts that, first, very
little is said in the KBA about the nature of learning, and, second, very little is said
about how the firm as an institution may promote (certain types of) learning
relative to market organization.  
The boundaries of the firm and learning.  Capabilities are also placed
centerstage in the KBA approach to the issue of the boundaries of the firm.  This
may be most clearly seen in the KBA analysis of diversification. In this analysis,
the development of capabilities is seen as steered by strong inertial forces that
narrowly circumscribe learning domains (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). For
example, excess management capabilities may be created as a natural by-product
of the firm’s activities (Penrose, 1959), but may only be deployed in closely related
industries.  This may be seen as an instance of a general KBA proposition, namely
that firms avoid undertaking activities that require dissimilar capabilities.  Instead,
the services from such capabilities are acquired through markets or inter-firm
relations, depending on the degree of complementarity of activities (Richardson,
1972).  Very specific and strategically important capabilities have to be deployed
                                                 
3 According to this analysis, only heterogeneous, rare and hard-to-imitate resources that are,
moreover, acquired in imperfect factor markets can be rent-yielding strategic assets to firms
(Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993).  See Foss and Knudsen (2000) for a critique of this analysis.
6internally, due to the absence of markets for these assets (Dierickx and Cool, 1989).
To sum up, in the KBA the boundaries of the firm are determined by capabilities
that are argued to be the results of a time-consuming and path-dependent process
of learning.
While there are many challenging and useful insights in the KBA analysis of
the boundaries of the firm, the analysis suffers from the use of intuitive, yet
essentially undefined concepts that are nevertheless claimed to be important
determinants of the boundaries of the firm.  Notably, it is not clear what is meant
by capabilities being “similar” or “dis-similar” (as recognized by Richardson, 1972
himself), or by learning domain being “narrow,” although these concepts are seen
as central to an understanding of where firms will place their boundaries.
Therefore, in its present stage of development the analysis does not allow for an
identification of the firm’s efficient boundaries.4  Moreover, for an approach that
places so much emphasis on knowledge building, there is a surprisingly static
quality to the analysis of the boundaries of the firm.   Thus, there is little analysis
of how the boundaries of the firm change under the impact of learning.5
The existence of the firm and learning.   According to KBA writers, the issue
of why firms exist can be addressed in terms of capabilities and learning rather
than in terms of incentives and property rights.  Thus, according to Kogut and
Zander (1992), firms can – because of an asserted and somewhat mystical function
as “moral communities” and bodies of what they call “higher-order organizing
principles”-  create learning processes and achieve coordination that are
inaccessible under market relations.  In other words, firms exist because they more
efficiently than markets produce, store and utilize capabilities.  The obvious
problem with this explanation is that exactly the same argument has been made of
behalf of markets.  Thus, Hayek (1945) famously argued that the market’s
                                                 
4  We do believe, however, that with respect to the analysis of the boundaries of the firm, the KBA
points to important determinants that are neglected in OE (cf. Langlois and Robertson, 1995;
Langlois and Foss, 1999).
5  The work of Langlois and Robertson (1995) is a partial exception to this claim.  Even in this
work, however, firm-specific learning processes are not spelled out in any detail.
7superiority must ultimately be traced to its superior learning capabilities.  KBA
analysis does not offer clear criteria that tells us why firms as institutions should
be superior with respect to learning than markets are, that is, when we should
expect to see firms arise from market relations because rational agents choose this
institutional structure to govern their joint learning processes.  This is not to say
that criteria cannot be constructed from KBA analysis; in fact, one may argue that
such criteria can be found in what KBA writers have said about internal
organization. We turn to this next.
Internal organization and learning. Some KBA writers claim that the
approach has implications for understanding internal organization that are
completely different from OE (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Ghoshal, Moran and
Almeida-Costa, 1995).  Implicitly, these implications may be used for rationalizing
of the existence of the firm in terms of its superior abilitity to foster and organize
learning processes, that is, accumulate capabilities.  The argument goes roughly as
follows.  Empirical evidence from big companies suggest that these firms do not
fundamentally use the kind of control and incentive mechanisms in their internal
organization that an OE perspective would lead one to believe (Ghoshal, Moran
and Almeida-Costa, 1995).6  Rather, these companies try hard to construct a
“shared context”, that is, an internal institutional context that not only act as a
coordinating device but more fundamentally influence the values and ambitions of
employees.   This assists “… the development and utilization of local knowledge
for local initiatives” (Ghoshal, Moran and Almeida-Costa, 1995: 752).  In other
words, the rationale of internal organization is to stimulate an ongoing learning
process.  In contrast, OE is claimed to be “bad for practice” (Ghoshal and Moran,
1996), because it operates with an overly cynical view of human nature. Thus, to
follow the prescriptions flowing from OE will result in perverse psychological
                                                                                                                                          
6  It is not completely clear what is meant by arguing that OE prescribes “blunt control” and high-
powered incentives as characteristics of firm organization.  On the contrary, OE writers have long
recognized that firms do not in general use high-powered incentives (Williamson, 1985; Milgrom
and Roberts, 1991).
8responses and impede the development and utilization of local knowledge for local
initiatives.
The main problem with this analysis is not that it is incorrect (although the
polemics against OE are), but that it doesn’t go sufficiently far.   Thus, it is correct
that firms rely more on “low-powered” incentives than markets do, and that there
is some sort of connection between such incentives and learning.  However, this
connection is not very strongly developed in the KBA.
Discussion
The KBA is often marketed as an approach that, compared to other
approaches to economic organization, places learning centerstage in the
explanation of issues such as the competitive advantage, existence, boundaries, and
internal organization of the firm (Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996).   For example,
different path-dependent learning processes lead to differential capabilities that in
turn help to explain competitive advantage and the boundaries of the firm.  The
existence and internal organization of firms are explained in a functionalist fashion
by pointing to a purported superior capability of firms relative to markets to build
capabilities, that is, engage in organizational learning. Moreover, KBA writers
usually stress that it is possible to somehow construct theoretical links between
learning processes and these phenomena that does not make use of OE reasoning
relating to incentives and property rights in the explanation (Kogut and Zander,
1992, 1996; Grant, 1996).   For example, the approach is claimed to offer an
explanation of the existence of firms that is “opportunism-independent” (Conner
and Prahalad, 1996).
Although the KBA deserves much credit for stressing firm-level learning, we
have argued that the approach does not successfully establish links between
learning and capabilities (i.e., the asserted outcomes of firm-specific learning
processes) on the one hand, and between learning, capabilities and economic
organization (i.e., the existence, boundaries and internal organization of firms) on
the other hand.   Because the links between individual learning processes, firm-
9level learning and capabilities as the outcomes of learning processes are only
vaguely described, capabilities are essentially a black box in the KBA.  Although
the notion of firm capability may turn out to be a useful meta-concept, it is at
present without clear theoretical foundations in theories of individual behavior
(Foss and Foss, 2000a).  To the extent that arguments about economic organization,
not to mention normative arguments (e.g., about firm strategy), involve the notion
of capabilities, some healthy skepticism is therefore advisable.
One possible reason for the confusion that we discern in the KBA is the lack of
a more rigorous theoretical understanding of the problems that require firm
organization rather than market organization.   For example, Williamson’s brand of
transaction cost economics started out with a very well defined problem, namely
that of the efficiency implications of vertical integration (Williamson, 1971).  In his
attempt to provide answers to this problem, Williamson inquired into the
characteristics of mainstream economics which made an efficiency-oriented
explanation of vertical integration difficult, which — in turn —made it possible for
him to substitute these with concepts that were appropriate to his aim (e.g.,
opportunism and incomplete contracts.).  This allowed Williamson and other
contributors to OE to arrive at an exemplary instance of solving a well-defined
problem, from which OE could build in a cumulative fashion.
In contrast, KBA arguments rather loosely turn on the development of
learning and innovation capabilities that purportedly markets cannot develop
(Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996; Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996).  In a friendly reading,
there is an underlying efficiency argument underneath the reasoning.  Although
one may thus argue that KBA writers also try to provide answers to problems of
economic organization, these problems are not well-defined in the sense that
problems in OE are well-defined.  One reason for this is that is not clear what is the
background knowledge against which KBA problems are indeed problems.  To
illustrate, in the early stages of the development of OE, this background knowledge
was mainstream economics: Organizational phenomena (e.g., vertical integration)
could not be rendered intelligible in the context of mainstream economics — but at
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least it was possible to see where changes had to be made and how.  Thus, one
important reason for the progress of OE has been the relative ease with which
problems could be defined and solved, because the relevant background
knowledge and the associated problem-solving heuristics were so well defined.
In our view, much of the value of the KBA stems from its pointing to a host of
interesting real-world phenomena that theorizing should take seriously and which
have so far been largely neglected in the OE (Foss and Foss, 2000a).  However, the
KBA will benefit from more clearly defining what are the relevant real-world
phenomena, explaining why these phenomena represent challenges for theorizing,
clarifying the theoretical background knowledge against which these phenomena
are challenges, and, finally, provide rigorous explanations of the relevant
phenomena. This is not to say that the KBA should necessarily adopt the efficiency-
equilibrium-optimization mode of explanation that characterizes OE.  Other
avenues may be possible.   However, in our view, OE ideas are in fact very useful
for focusing and furthering KBA insights.  In the following section, we sketch how
ideas on the efficient allocation of property rights may be used for this purpose.
More specifically, we argue that these ideas can be used for the establishing an
understanding of learning in firms, and for connecting learning in firms with
economic organization and competitive advantage.
3. Learning, Economic Organization, and Property Rights
Learning and Economic Organization: Some Heuristic Suggestions
 The KBA is characterized by treating firm learning in a rather abstract and
general manner.  Thus, there is a plethora of references to firms learning (e.g.,
Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996; Madhok, 1996), without many discussions of the
finer aspects of learning in firms (as contained in, e.g., March, 1999).  Thus, it is
seldom made clear in a precise manner how individual and organizational
learning relate, what is required for organizational learning to take place, how
learning is influenced by the firm’s organizational structure and by its reward
11
systems, etc. Moreover, it is seldom made explicit how learning contribute to
competitive advantage.  More specifically, what are the problems that learning
helps to solve?  Thus, the notion of learning and the use made of the notion in the
KBA is diffuse.  This, we submit, is why KBA attempts to link together learning
and economic organization are so unconvincing.
Because of the inherent complexity of the notion of learning and its
ramifications, discussions of learning in firms should begin from well-defined
problems in well-defined settings, so that the complexity of the issues is
manageable.  Thus, what exactly is it that learning is supposed to do and how
should learning processes be organized to accomplish this aim? Who are involved
in the relevant learning processes, and how do individual learning activities
connect (if at all)?  In turn, these insights should as far as possible be phrased in a
unified language.   Our understanding of learning is, first, based on the premise
that learning is a means to improve problem-solving abilities (Dosi and Marengo,
1994).  However, this does not bring us much further in understanding learning
and how it connects to economic organization, unless we define what sort of
(organizational) problems that learning relates to.  Typically, this is what KBA
writers have not done.   From an economic point of view, the relevant problems
relate to increasing efficiency in the use of resources.  The aim of learning, in this
view, is to improve efficiency.  Thus, a firm has learned if it has increased its
potential for improving the efficiency with which it makes use of resources and
this increase can be ascribed to a change in the stock of knowledge of one or more
agents in the firm.7
                                                 
7 It may be argued that such learning is “static” and does not relate to issues of innovation.  This is
incorrect.  A (successful) innovation, whether relating to products or processes, is an efficiency
improvement.  Moreover, some may argue that our notion of learning is rational, incremental,
centered on inference from experience, and only related to successful outcomes of trials.
However, we believe that our notion is sufficiently broad to encompass many types of learning
and it does not only relate to successful outcome of trials.  With respect to the latter objection, even
a failed experiment in a failed is likely to increase the potential improving the efficiency with which
the firm makes use of resources, since the failure provides additional information.  With respect to
the types of learning that our notion encompasses, we don’t see any problems with including, for
example, the development of cognitive categories (Denzau and North, 1994).
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Although this does not mean that learning becomes reduced to solving
maximization problems, it does bring learning within the scope of economic
reasoning.  Moreover, it also relates to issues of economic organization, because
costs of learning will differ in a systematic way across different modes of economic
organization, such as firms, markets and hybrids.  (We shall later clarify some of
the determinants of these costs).  Thus, our methodological stipulations amount to
adopting, at least to some extent, the economist’s working practice of addressing
well-defined problems of efficient resource use in stylized settings.   It does not
necessarily mean that those who wish to address learning, competitive advantage
and economic organization should rely on economics as the only relevant set of
insights.  Focus and clarity may perhaps also be obtained from a sociological
starting point.  However, in the following we shall argue that it is possible to use
rather basic economic insights for the exploration of the links between learning,
economic organization and competitive advantage.  More specifically, these
insights are derived from the property rights perspective.  In accordance with our
methodological stipulations above, we shall use such insights to examine
particular types of learning in particular settings, namely with respect to the
optimization of complex production systems.
The Property Rights Perspective
OE is a collection of many theories.8 To be sure, the theoretical languages of
these theories differ.  However, these differences reflect dialects of the same
overall theoretical language - one with a vocabulary consisting of self-interested
behavior, economic equilibrium, transaction costs, and property rights (Furubotn
and Richter, 1998; Foss and Foss, 2000a).  This overall language is the property
rights approach (Alchian, 1965; Barzel, 1989; Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1964; Eggertson,
1990; Jones, 1983; Libecap, 1989; North, 1990; Foss and Foss, 2000b).  In fact, most
OE approaches can be subsumed under the property rights approach, because
                                                 
8 Including the transaction cost (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985, 1996), the agency  (Holmström,
1982; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1992), the measurement cost (Barzel,
1989), the information cost (Casson, 1994), the team (Marschak and Radner, 1972), and the
incomplete contracts (Hart, 1995) perspectives.
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these all look at different costs of specifying, exchanging and enforcing property
rights.   There are numerous characteristics of property rights that are salient to the
present discussion.   We present these in the following.
Types of rights.  Property rights are the rights agents hold over assets, such
as physical, human, financial, and intellectual assets.9  More specifically, they
include the following kinds of rights (Alchian, 1965; Eggertson, 1990):
1. Use rights, which define the potential uses of an asset.
2. Income rights, or the right to consume an asset.
3. Rights to exclude non-owners from access to assets.
4. Rights to transfer permanently to another party all the above mentioned rights
over an asset - that is to alienate or sell an assets.
Preciseness. An important characteristic of property rights is the degree of
preciseness with which they are delineated.  For example, one may distinguish
between specific and residual rights (Barzel, 1989; Hart, 1995).  Specific rights are
those rights that are specified in contracts and allocated between the transacting
parties before any transaction takes place.  Residual rights are those rights that are
not constrained by stipulations in contracts or by the law.  Both user and income
rights can be either specific or residual.  Residual income rights (or residual
claims) are the non-specified income or pleasure a person can enjoy from using or
alienating an asset (including his labor).   In firms rights and obligations may be
more or less clearly defined.   For example, if all rights are truly perfectly defined,
according to the so-called “Coase theorem” (Coase, 1960), this literally means that
· all possible uses of assets are fully known;
· all returns from all uses of all assets are perfectly known;
· all legitimate and illegitimate uses of assets are perfectly specified; and
· all this is perfectly enforceable.
                                                                                                                                          
9 In this paper, we use “assets” generically to refer to all these.
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If all rights are completely defined in this way, there cannot, by definition,
arise any conflicts over the use of scarce resources or the returns from assets,
because individuals do not have any discretion in the use of resources.  In
actuality, all rights are far from perfectly defined.  Indeed, as the OE literature
explains, it is exactly the imperfect delineation of rights that opens the door for
organizational phenomena.  For example, both the agency problem (Holmström,
1982; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) and the hold-up problem (Hart, 1995;
Williamson 1996), with all the many implications with respect to ownership,
organizational structure, performance, etc. that may be distilled from these,
essentially arise because of imperfect delineation of rights.  As we shall argue, the
allocation and delineation of property rights are also crucial for understanding
“softer” phenomena, such as corporate culture (Jones, 1983) and learning in firms.
Property Rights, transaction costs, and learning.  In order to understand the
link between property rights and learning, it is convenient to start with the world
defined by the Coase theorem.  As stated above, it is hard to think of learning in a
regime of perfectly defined property rights, since in this world, all uses of
resources are perfectly known and delineated (cf. Coase, 1988).   In other words,
there is nothing to discover in such a world.10  The other side of the coin is that
when there is room for learning in a social system, this means that rights are
imperfectly delineated relative to the above idea.
From a property rights perspective, imperfect delineation is caused by
transaction costs.  Conventionally, these include costs of measuring the attributes
of assets, as well as negotiating and enforcing contracts on asset uses (Barzel,
1997).  However, we should not forget that transaction costs also encompass costs
of discovering asset uses, as Coase (1937) pointed out, and as Brian Loasby (1999:
74) has argued, transaction costs are to a large extent knowledge costs. This
establishes one link between learning and transaction costs, in the sense that
                                                 
10  This may be criticized on the ground that the above stipulation of the implications of the
Coasean assumption zero transaction cost assumption are too restrictive, since this assumption
does not necessarily imply the absence of discovery (cf. Kirzner, 1973).   This may be debated; the
zero cost transaction cost assumption is often taken to also imply zero information cost.
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learning may reduce transaction costs.  On the other hand, there is also a link from
transaction costs to learning, because some kinds of learning involve the efforts of
many agents, which may cause considerable transaction costs.   These two
different links are shown in figure 1, as arrows A and B, respectively.   Also shown
in the figure are the links between transaction costs, imperfect delineation and
attempts to improve delineation.  The plusses over the arrows indicate that
increasing transaction costs means that rights will be more imperfectly delineated,
but that more imperfect delineation create incentives to reduce transaction costs
through learning.
XXXX Insert Figure 1 About Here XXXX
Attributes and learning. An important aspect of the preciseness of property
rights is the notion of attributes (i.e., the characteristics and uses of assets).  Thus,
in the property rights approach, assets are seen as having multiple attributes,
where attributes are characteristics and possible uses of assets. For example, a
simple copying machine is a multi-attribute asset in the sense that it can be used in
different time periods, by many different persons, for many different types of
copying work, can be purchased in different colours, sizes, etc.  Because of human
mental limitations (i.e., bounded rationality), all such attributes are not likely to be
known initially.  This makes room for learning. Attributes relate to learning in (at
least) two ways (cf. figure 1).
First, learning can be a matter of discovering ways of reducing costs of
measuring given attributes.11  For example, in the food and vegetable industry,
much innovative activity has centered on developing techniques that will allow for
more efficient measurement of the attributes of size, colour, durability, etc. of
                                                 
11 Relatedly, Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 94) argue that efficiency differences between firms arise
as a consequence “... not of having better resources but in knowing more accurately the relative
productive performances of those resources.  Poorer resources can be paid less in accord with their
inferiority; greater accuracy of knowledge of the potential and actual productive actions of inputs
rather than having high productivity resources makes a firm (or an assignment of inputs)
profitable.”
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various kinds of fruit and vegetables (Kirsten Foss, 1996).  Second, learning can be
a matter of discovering relevant attributes of assets that were hitherto unknown. In
fact, most assets are likely to possess hitherto undiscovered attributes. Thus, as
Penrose (1959) stressed, the services (i.e., its attributes) of an asset — say, a
machine — are not given to the operating personnel in the firm that acquires the
machine but has to be discovered by them in a learning by doing manner.
Contracts and authority.  Contracts, whether formal or informal, are used to
define the terms of transfer of rights to attributes.  To specify and to contract over
the different attributes assets are clearly costly actions - more precisely, they
involve costs of delineating, transferring, capturing and protecting rights. When
such costs exist, not everything can be specified in contracts.  Notably, the
employment contract is left partly open because of prohibitively high costs of
specifying in detail all rights and obligations of the employee in all future
conceivable situations (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985).  However, because of the
multi-attribute nature of most assets, virtually all contracts will be incomplete
(Foss and Foss, 2000b).  This may cause various types of problems related to
conflicting resource uses, of which the hold-up situation of Williamson (1985) and
Hart (1995) is only one example of a large set of costly bargaining problems.  In
OE, most attention has centered on these bargaining problems and on their
institutional remedies.  Less attention has been allocated to the problem of
discovering productive uses and services (i.e., new attributes) of  assets and how
this process is best organized, although this was arguably a major point in Coase’s
original paper  (Loasby, 1999; Kirsten Foss, 2000). As we argue in the following
section, it is exactly this type of learning process that connects to issues of
economic organization.
4. Learning and Economic Organization:
a Property Rights Perspective
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In this section, we shall develop a property rights view of firms as institutions
“...specializing in the speed and efficiency in the creation ... of knowledge” (Kogut
and Zander, 1996: 503).  More specifically, we shall argue that relative to markets
firms may have advantages in developing knowledge about how to coordinate
what we shall call “complex production systems.”  In other words, we shall argue
that OE perspectives, as represented by property rights insights, are actually
capable of handling issues of learning as these relate to economic organization.
Costs of Coordination and Mode of Coordination
At least since Coase (1937), economists have known that the costs of
coordinating transactions vary with the mode of coordination.  However, they
have arguably paid less attention to two central ideas in that paper.  The first
neglected idea is that the advantage of the firm mode over the market mode
diminishes as the marginal costs of coordination increase with more tasks being
coordinated within the boundaries of a firm (Coase, 1937).12  The second neglected
idea is that firms may exist as low-cost coordination devices because of the
flexibility afforded by a structure of incomplete contracts and the discretion
provided by managerial authority.  These two ideas are related, for the second
idea make room for learning by firms, and such learning may in turn reduce the
marginal costs of coordinating.
In contrast, most contributors to OE take the costs of coordinating
transactions in the economy as given, in the sense that the costs of organizing a
certain transaction with certain characteristics (e.g., the degree of asset specificity)
are the same, not only across firms but also over time.  They proceed to analyze the
allocation of transactions over alternative modes of economic organization with
given costs.  However, in actuality the costs of coordinating productive activities
may change over time as a consequence of learning in coordination.  Moreover, the
                                                 
12 For example, transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985, 1996) or incomplete contract theory
(Grossman and Hart 1986) do not make this point.
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costs of learning about coordinating may differ systematically across modes of
economic organization.
Our main points in the following are, first, that learning in a firm may be
understood as the discovery in that firm of a lower-cost way of coordinating
production tasks, and, second, that some types of learning are more efficiently
realized in firms than in markets, namely learning about how to coordinate a
complex and interdependent system of production tasks.
Coordinating Complex Production Systems
We begin from the notion of complex production system, by which we mean
a system of productive tasks where there are many complementarities between
tasks. A “task” is a set of activities that are carried out by one agent.  The notion of
“complementarity” is an important one in this context.  First, it suggests that a
complex production system will not normally encompass the whole economy, but
will be an island of assets characterized by strong complementarities in a sea with
competitive and complementary asset uses  (Richardson, 1972).  Second, it
introduces a need for qualitative coordination, that is, the coordination of the uses
of assets in terms of time and place.  Now, it is well-known that qualitative
coordination may be handled through including non-price information in
contracts; for example, it has often been pointed out that the need for strong
qualitative coordination in a steelworks does not logically imply firm
organization.   Rather, appeal to asset specificity is required (Willamson, 1985).
Thus, in the steelworks example, one may point to “site” or “temporal” specificity
as the relevant type of specificity that may explain why steelworks-specific
transactions are organized within firms, since these types of specificity will also
introduce a hold-up possibility. The only coordination problem that is relevant to
economic organization concerns the provision of the ex ante incentives that will
secure the efficient (given the constraints of the problem) investments in assets
(Hart, 1995).
Learning-by-Experimenting in Complex Production Systems
19
However, in our opinion, complex production systems influence economic
organization in other, more subtle ways.  For example, temporal and site
specificity may not be data for the problem of determining efficient organization.
Instead, relations of temporal and location specificity may be something that is
discovered as a result of experimenting with a complex production system.   The
deeper, more subtle question then is how this process of experimenting is best
organized. Arguably, in much of OE, there is an assumption that technological
knowledge is a datum, and the choice is one between technologies characterized by
different degrees of asset specificity  (Langlois and Foss, 1999).   The question of
discovering optimal uses of assets in a complex production system is, in contrast,
not inquired into.  However, understanding how this process connects to economic
organization is not outside the scope of OE, as we shall argue in the following.
In the context of a complex production system, bounded rationality implies
that agents are not likely to have full knowledge ex ante about, for example, the
optimal sequencing of tasks, even if they perfectly know the functionalities of
(physical) assets.  For example, the problem of defining an optimal sequence of
tasks in a complex systems of production may require more calculation capacity
than is available in a supercomputer (Galloway, 1996).13  Given this, some sort of
experimental process is necessary.  What is the nature of this process? And what
the necessary requirements for the process to be efficient?
First, one must identify the system boundaries, that is, where the relevant
interdependencies are most likely to be located.  Second, the experimental process
must be in the nature of a controlled experiment (or a sequence of such
experiments), so as to isolate the system from outside disturbances.  Third, there
should be some sort of guidance for the experiment.  This may take many forms,
ranging from centrally provided instructions, over agreement between the
involved parties to the experiments, to shared understandings of where in the
                                                 
13 Thus, in describing the problem of scheduling batches in a 5 stage production process, Galloway
(1996) writes: “[t]he best schedule is the one which minimizes this idle time. Unfortunately, the
only way to find the best schedule is by trial and error, and with 20 batches there are 1.8x1018
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system to begin experimenting, how to avoid overlapping experiments, how to
react to certain results from experimenting with respect to changing the
experiment, etc.
Note this sort of experimental activity is not a flight of our fancy; it is what
takes place in manufacturing departments on a regular basis in connection with
error identification,  installment of new equipment, fine-tuning of equipment, fine-
tuning of routines, finding ways of adjusting to new inputs or input qualities, etc.
In the present context, the problem is how this process is best organized.  While
the three characteristics of efficient experimenting that we listed above are
necessary, they are not sufficient.   This is because the experimental process may
be organized in different ways, and the efficiency with which experimenting is
carried out is dependent upon how it is organized.   There are many dimensions to
this issue.  For example, one may ask what is the optimal organization structure
for conducting a process of experimental learning.  However, we are interested
here in the more fundamental issue of how a process of experimental learning in a
complex production system can provide a reason for the existence of the firm, that
is, why, under certain circumstances, markets may be inefficient means of
organizing the process.
Learning-by-Experimenting and the Existence of the Firm
The problem of optimizing a complex production system may seem to be a
purely technical one.  However, it may be directly linked to property rights
economics.  In a world of complete knowledge and zero transaction cost, all rights
to all uses of all assets could be specified in contracts.  However, a complex
production system may imply that agents are unable to specify on an ex ante basis
rights over assets in such a way that each task fits optimally to all other tasks
carried out in the system. Thus, complete contracts cannot be drafted, and
contracting in a complex production system is thus unavoidably incomplete ex
ante.  The question is under which circumstances such incomplete contracting
                                                                                                                                          
possible schedules. This problem is too large even for modern computers, so a simplifying
assumption is frequently used” (p.64).
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necessitates firm organization.  By the latter term, we mean managed coordination
by means of orders rather than by means of decentrally determined prices.
According to Coase (1937) the reason for the existence of firms is that there
are costs of using the price mechanism and that “[t]he most obvious cost of
‘organizing’ production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what
the relevant prices are” (Coase, 1937: 21).   Suppose that the market, that is, a
system of legally independent agents and no central direction, was to organize
controlled experimentation with a complex production system.  What would be
the costs of organizing this, that is, why would there be “costs of discovering what
the relevant prices are” in this situation?
Most notably, specific assets may be involved which may give rise to the
well-known problems of hold-up (Williamson, 1985, 1996; Hart, 1995).   Trivially,
such a situation may arise if from the outset one or more assets are already
specific.  More interestingly, however, specificity may be an outcome of a process
of experimenting.  More specifically, as experimental activity leads to improved
learning about how to optimize the system, assets will be increasingly specific in
terms of time and location.  Time and site specificity increase as the uses of assets
become more efficiently coordinated.14  This is one force pulling in the direction of
firm organization, though not the only one.  Another force is the problems created
by bounded rationality (independently of considerations of opportunism).
Recall that we argued that there is a set of necessary conditions for efficient
experimenting, such as the ability to define system boundaries, isolating the
experiment from outside disturbances, and “guiding” the experimental activity.
There may be market failure in connection with all three conditions.  The main
problem is that there is not likely to be shared conjectures with respect to these
three conditions.15   With bounded rationality, agents may disagree about system
boundaries and how to isolate the system from outside disturbances.  Even
                                                 
14  To illustrate, just-in-time production systems often lead to an increase in asset specificity.
15 And it must be emphasized that because of the experimental nature of the process, we must be
dealing with conjectures rather than proven knowledge.
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abstracting from these problems, so that the system is well defined and isolated
from outside disturbances, there may still be problems of coordination.  This is
because complex complementary systems are likely to exhibit multiple equilibria,
so that it is not obvious how to coordinate on equilibria or even which equilibria
are the most preferred ones.
In principle, one may imagine that an experimenting team hires an outside
consultant that guides the experimental activity in the sense that he gives advice
on the sequencing of actions and asset uses, initiate the experiments, draws the
appropriate conclusions from each experiments, determine how these conclusions
should influence further experimenting and so on.  However, such an arrangement
is likely to run into numerous bargaining costs, not the least because under market
contracting, any team member may be able to veto the advice provided by the
consultant.  Succumbing to authority may be the cost effective way of organizing
the experimental activity.
“Authority” here means that managers are given the rights to redefine and
reallocate rights among team members, and the rights to sanction team members if
these don’t utilize their rights efficiently.16  For example, managers decide on who
is going to perform which tasks when.  The possession of these rights means that
managers are able to conduct experiments without continuously having to re-
negotiate contracts; this saves barganing and ink-costs. Moreover, the right to
sanction team members also economizes on the agency costs from rights that are
used inefficiently (Jensen and Meckling, 1992).  Managers then are able to create
“controlled” experiments in which they only change some aspects of tasks in order
to trace the effects of some specific re-arrangements of rights.  Arranging property
rights in this way is tantamount to forming a firm.  To sum up, we have argued
that managed direction ¾ that is, the firm ¾ saves transaction costs when in
complex production systems, sequential delineation and reallocation of rights over
                                                                                                                                          
16 A complex production system is likely to be characterized by substantial information
externalities, stemming from agents’ private information (Holmström, 1982).
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assets are required as a means of gradually improving the functional performance
of such systems.  As we argue next, this view also has implications for the
understanding of the boundaries of the firm.
Learning-by-Experimenting, Coordination Knowledge, and the Boundaries of
the Firm
In his retrospective assessment of his own 1937 paper, Coase (1991: 73)
pointed to the necessity of uncovering “... the reasons why the costs of organizing
particular activities differ among firms” (p.73).  He criticized existing theories of
the firm for paying too little attention to this problem.  However, resolving the
problem  is important for a more precise understanding of the efficient boundaries
of firms.  In other words, if firms are not equally efficient at coordinating the same
types of tasks, this should influence the boundaries of firms.17 The arguments
presented earlier suggest that learning-by-experimenting in complex production
systems  and the creation of coordination knowledge result in different abilities
and thus different costs among firms with respect to organize different kinds of
tasks.18 The boundaries of firms reflect these endogenous changes in production
and coordination costs as agents learn in production and coordination.
Based on the arguments presented earlier, we argue that the importance of
learning in coordination depends on the nature of the technological
interdependencies  in a complex production system. A highly complex (in the
sense of Simon, 1969) production system necessitates more learning-by-
experimenting than a less complex system, primarily because the latter is more
decomposable.  As we have argued, there may be advantages from organizing
                                                 
17  As suggested by Richardson’s (1972) analysis.
18 Socially developed norms, rules and routines also reduce costs of coordination. Norms and
routines make the behavior of others more predictable thus reducing the need for information
required to coordinate actions. In the terminology of property rights, norms and routines can be
said to act as self-enforcing constraints on use rights.  Such norms and routines certainly also play
a great role in determining the costs of coordination in different firms and the decision to make
rather than to buy may often be grounded on superior, non-imitable and non transferable routines
which aids coordination in production.  Norms and routines are not confined to firms; they may as
well evolve as means of coordinating actions between independent individuals or individuals in
different firms. In that case they also reduce costs of market transactions.
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learning-by-experimenting in the former type of systems inside the boundaries of
the firm — at least until sufficient experimentation have resulted in precise
knowledge about the nature of interdependencies.  Possessing such coordination
knowledge means that it becomes possible to precisely delineate and allocate
rights to take specific actions in ways that ensure the coordination of the system.
This also implies that well-defined tasks may be spun-off to outside suppliers, that
is, market contracts substitute for managed direction.
However, if the production system is often perturbed in an unpredictable
manner by outside disturbances, hierarchical coordination may still continue to
hold sway (Coase, 1937; Langlois and Robertson, 1995).  Furthermore, since an
outcome of learning-by-experimenting may be increased asset specificity, the
unpredictable nature of outside disturbances introduces problems of hold-up.
Thus, even if a task is well-defined in most situations, it may still be kept within
the boundaries of the because of the hold-up problem.
Learning-by-Experimenting and Competitive Advantage
The process of learning-by-experimenting is likely to be path-dependent and
complex.  The precise outcome of the learning process is a result of the starting
point of the process, the conjectures that participants in the process have formed
and tried out, how they have reacted to falsified conjectures, etc.  Thus, the
resulting coordination knowledge is likely to be complex and contain many tacit
elements.  In line with the KBA analysis, such coordination knowledge  may
therefore be costly to transfer using market contracts (as in Kogut and Zander,
1992).19 This may explain the observed path-dependency in the kind of activities
firms undertake (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).
Since processes of learning-by-experimenting are path-dependent, firms are
likely to end up with different stocks of coordination knowledge, even for the
same underlying coordination problems.  In turn, this implies that stocks of
coordination knowledge across firms in an industry are associated with
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differential efficiencies.  Therefore, these knowledge assets yield differential rents
(Lippman and Rumelt, 1982).   These rents may also be sustainable when the
coordination knowledge that emerges from path-dependent processes of learning-
by-experimenting is complex and contains tacit elements, making it costly to
imitate.
5. Discussion
In this section, we briefly explore some issues that emerge from the above
discussions, and which we have only treated superficially or not treated at all.  We
shall treat the scope of our experimental view of the firm, as well as the link
between individual and social learning.
Broadening the Experimental View of the Firm
Arguably, our conceptualization of the link between learning-by-
experimenting and economic organization is a very narrow one, only focusing on
the optimizing of complex production systems.  Now, we deliberately chose such a
narrow focus in order to keep the discussion manageable (cf. section 3).  However,
one may clearly argue that the experimental view of the firm is much broader in
scope.
It is often impossible to find an optimum using analytical methods in systems
that are characterized by many interdependencies and complementarities.
Moreover, in complex systems, one may not even have identified the relevant
interdepencies and complementarities.  In both cases, learning-by-experimenting
is required. Many firms are complex social systems, characterized by multiple
interdependencies and complementarities that cut across departments and
divisions, and are not just confined to production.  It is an established truth in
organization theory (e.g., Thompson, 1967) that rational organizational structure
                                                                                                                                          
19 This explanation is consistent with Demsetz (1991) who also argues that firms are not perfect
substitutes in production of goods and services.
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should reflect such interdependencies and complementarities.  From the
perspective of property rights economics, the purpose of organization structure is
to handle externalities in a way that is conducive to organizational goals.
Organization structure is essentially an allocation of property rights (Jones, 1983).
Moreover, as Loasby (1976: 133) perceptively noted, an organizational
structure “... not only determines where an organization’s problems are worked,
but also helps to determine what problems they shall be, how they are defined,
and what solutions will be attempted.”  Thus, “... each part of an organization is a
kind of experimental design.”  We may add that such “experimental designs” are
often nested, in the sense that the experiments that goes on in different parts of an
organization may influence other parts of that organization.  In turn, this implies
that the property rights structure represented by organization structure is itself an
experimental design!  Thus, our basic argument that experimentation, property
rights, and economic organization are closely related is applicable to a much
broader context than complex production systems.
Organizational Learning and Learning-by-Experimenting
A key point in the KBA is that firms exist because they help structuring
processes of organizational learning.  Thus, Kogut and Zander (1992: 384) argue
that “... organizations are social communities in which individual and social
expertise is transformed into economically useful products and services,” and
exist  for this reason (see also Spender, 1996 and Kogut and Zander, 1996 for
similar arguments).  Now, “organizational learning” is a term that is very seldom
defined with much precision in the literature.20  However, contributors to the
literature seem to agree that organizational learning is a phenomenon that lies
outside the orbit of rational choice, is stored in routines, and somehow emerges
from the interaction of multiple actors in a history-dependent way (March, 1999).
                                                 
20  For example, Weick and Westerly’s (1995) presumably authoritative discussion of
organizational learning in the Handbook of Organization Studies does not offer a single clear
definition of the concept.
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Much of the literature is therefore strongly descriptive (Weick and Westerly,
1995).
We agree that learning may be important to understanding the rationales of
firms, and that it should be much more centrally placed in OE.  However, we
have problems with the existing literature on organizational learning. First, one
searches in vain for precise criteria that distinguishes individual from
organizational learning.  Second, we fail to realize why it should not be possible
to address at least important aspects of organizational learning by means of
rational choice methodology.   The learning-by-experimenting approach
addresses both these two problems.
With respect to the distinction between individual and organizational
learning, it may be argued that as an uncontroversial minimum organizational
learning is learning that takes place within organizations.  The problem then
concerns why some learning processes are organized inside firms whereas other
learning processes may take place across markets.  In other words, do learning
processes most efficiently take place between independent individual agents or
between individual agents that interact within a hierarchical structure, such as a
firm?  In this paper, we have provided reasons why firms (organizations) may in
some circumstances organize processes of learning more efficiently than markets
are capable of doing.  We have relied on rational choice methodology throughout,
arguing that rational agents will have to rely on learning-by-experimenting when
they are faced with complex production systems.21   Thus, our approach deals
with both difficulties associated with the concept of organizational learning.
6. Conclusion
                                                 
21 This is not to say that “non-rational” elements such as intuition, humour, routine-based decisions,
etc. (Weick and Westerly, 1995; March, 1999) may not play a role, for example, in the formation of
conjectures that are tried out in experimental learning and the interpretation of the evidence from
experiments.
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We began this paper by discussing the critique, launched by proponents of the
KBA, that OE perspectives put all the emphasis on the allocation of incentives and
property rights and neglects processes of learning.   Although it is true that so far
OE writers have had little to say about processes of learning and their
consequences, we have suggested that there is no inherent reason why OE should
be cut off from treating learning and exploring its organizational implications.
More specifically, we demonstrated that it is possible to adopt an approach to
learning that is consistent with rational choice methodology and stresses
economizing, puts the emphasis on learning as a means to realizing efficiencies, is
micro-analytic, and contains implications for economic organization.   In order to
focus these ideas, we concentrated on the role of experimentation as a means of
finding solutions to coordination problems in complex production systems (e.g.,
finding the optimal sequence of activities). and the transaction costs learning-by-
experimenting may create.  Such transaction costs help determine the existence,
boundaries and internal organization of the firm, and has implications for the
understanding of competitive advantage.  This is one way in which OE may come
better to grips with processes of learning and their implications for economic
organization and competitive advantage.  We have no doubt that there are many
other such ways.  Future work will explore these.
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